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# THE SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

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## MIRABEAU BUONAPARTE LAMAR

A. K. CHRISTIAN

### CHAPTER V

#### THE SANTA FE EXPEDITION

Perhaps of all the things undertaken or accomplished by Lamar, the project of sending a mercantile expedition to Santa Fé accompanied by a military aid has caused most adverse criticism. Most historians have followed contemporaries, particularly Houston, and near contemporaries, as Yoakum, and are content to refer to Lamar's scheme as visionary. As it was one of the policies that gripped him throughout his whole administration, and as its failure has led to so much criticism, a full examination of his purposes in sending such an expedition, and the obstacles confronted by those who undertook it, is necessary.

It should be understood, in the beginning, that Texas claimed, whether rightly or wrongly, all the territory to the east of the Rio Grande, and Santa Fé was about twelve miles east of that river in New Mexico. Shortly after the constitutional government was established in October, 1836, Stephen F. Austin, Texan Secretary of State, in his instructions to William H. Wharton, the envoy to the United States, said that as regarded boundary, the question could not be settled at that time, but that Wharton might explain to the Government of the United States that Texas claimed possession to the Rio Grande. He traced the boundary as follows: Beginning at the mouth of said river on the Gulf of Mexico, thence up the middle of the river, following its main

channel, including the islands, to its most northerly source, then in a straight line to the United States boundary, and along that boundary to the starting point.<sup>1</sup>

The First Congress took early action in proclaiming the boundaries of the new republic, and on December 19, 1836, the President approved an act providing that the civil and political jurisdiction of Texas should extend to include the boundaries as Austin had outlined them to Wharton, at the same time the President was directed to open negotiations with the United States to ascertain and determine the boundary between those two countries.<sup>2</sup> And from that time on the Rio Grande to its source was officially considered as the western boundary of Texas.

Just when Lamar conceived the idea of establishing the authority of Texas over the territory included in this claim, it is not possible to say; nor can we determine positively what motive chiefly influenced him in adopting the policy which he ultimately carried out. It is likely that he began his administration as President with some idea of taking possession of the Santa Fé country, though it was not until the last year of his administration that he was able actually to undertake the measure. There is no doubt that he desired to establish control, partly because he was convinced that the people of New Mexico desired to live under Texan sovereignty, and partly because he wished to create a nation reaching ultimately to the Pacific; but chiefly because he understood the commercial benefits that would accrue to Texas through a diversion of the trade between St. Louis and Santa Fé to the ports of Texas,

The importance of this trade to Texas was early recognized. On August 27, 1829, Stephen F. Austin wrote to Henry Austin, stating that he contemplated opening a road to El Paso and to Santa Fé with a view to diverting the Missouri trade to Galveston.<sup>3</sup> Later, in 1835, Austin recommended to the Mexican government that two companies of riflemen be stationed on the Colorado and Brazos rivers for the purpose of defense and for opening a road to Chihuahua.<sup>4</sup> One cannot say whether these suggestions in-

<sup>1</sup>Garrison, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas*, I, 132. American Historical Association Report, 1907, II.

<sup>2</sup>Gammel, *Laws of Texas*, I, 1193-1194.

<sup>3</sup>Austin Papers, file of July, 1836. University of Texas.

<sup>4</sup>Stephen F. Austin to James F. Perry, March 4, 1835, in *ibid.*

fluenced Lamar, but he was acquainted with them, and, as will appear, he adopted a policy in keeping with the ideas of Austin.

At the same time that the commerce with Santa Fé was becoming attractive to the Texans, it seemed that the people of New Mexico were about to throw off their yoke of allegiance to the Mexican government, and there was reason to suppose that Texan rule would not be objectionable. In 1835, when a strong central government was established in Mexico, resulting in the secession of Texas from the Mexican government, Colonel Albino Perez was sent to take charge of the province of New Mexico. The people up to that time had been ruled by native governors and resented the appointment of a stranger as governor. The new governor introduced a system of direct taxation which proved unsatisfactory, but the populace took no active steps in opposition until a native *alcalde* was imprisoned by the *Prefecto* of the northern district. The *alcalde* was released by a mob, upon which the governor called out the militia to put down the mob. It developed that the militia were in sympathy with the mob, however, and, only a few adhering to the governor, he was easily taken by the mob and put to death. The mob proceeded to elect a governor of their own, and managed to hold out as an independent government until put down by Armijo in January, 1838.<sup>5</sup>

The Texan authorities knew of the rebellion, but they were not aware that it had been put down. On January 5, 1838, the secretary of state wrote the Texan minister in London, as follows:

The Californias continue independent of Mexico, and recently a rebellion in Santa Fé resulted in the death of the Governor and a number of the principal officers of the Government, and the appointment on the part of the revolutionists, of commissioners to apply to the U. States for admission; not knowing, I suppose, that they are included within the limits claimed by Texas.<sup>6</sup>

Shortly after the inauguration of Lamar an act was passed for the creation of a regiment of regular soldiers for warfare against the Indians.<sup>7</sup> Colonel Edward Burleson, with a full staff of subordinate officers, was stationed at Bastrop, an outlying settlement

<sup>5</sup>Josiah Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies*, I, 130-136.

<sup>6</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, III, 838. The secretary of state was wrong in saying that application for annexation to the United States was considered.

<sup>7</sup>Gammel, *Laws of Texas*, II, 15.

on the Colorado. On January 14, 1839, an act was passed for the permanent location of the seat of government, and this location was to be limited to some point between the Trinity and the Colorado, north of the San Antonio Road.<sup>8</sup> The connection between these two acts will appear presently.

Among the officers under the above act, William Jefferson Jones was appointed as a lieutenant. He had taken part in the campaigns against the Indians in the East in the summer of 1838. He was in Houston in December, 1838, or January, 1839, and it appears that he was the first to outline a program for taking possession of the Santa Fé country. He had a conversation with Lamar on the subject, but whether he initiated the proposal, there is no present way of knowing. The only record of the conversation is contained in a letter from Jones to Lamar a short time later, and this would indicate that the originator of the scheme was Jones. It is necessary to quote at length from this letter in order to make clear the connection of Jones with the enterprise.

Genl M. B. Lamar.  
My dear Sir,

Bastrop Feby 8th, 1839,

In a letter, which I addressed to the Secretary at War a few days since relative to the contemplated expedition against the Comanches, I took occasion to refer to the importance of the Santa Fe trade and of the facilities of diverting it to the Colorado Valley, the natural outlet for all commerce of the North Western Territory of Texas, at this moment the most productive portion of it. The lowest estimate of the trade of what was formerly New Mexico has been placed at \$20,000,000 (millions), consisting of gold & silver and the rich furs of the mountains, which now pass out by the Red River valley and the Rio Grande, building up the towns of St. Louis and Matamoras. . . .

Whilst in the City of Houston and at the time of my appointment to the Regiment against the Comanches, I suggested to you the importance of a politico-military mission to Santa Fe with a view to the introduction of the trade of New Mexico thro' the natural outlet within the limits of this Republic.

. . . I have every reason to believe the seat of government will be located on the Colorado between this place and the mountains, probably at their foot and I have no doubt, the selection will be the most judicious which can be made within the limits assigned the Commissioners by the law. In that event the Capital of the Nation may command the entire trade of New Mex-

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 163.

ico. . . . With a view to the immediate diversion of this trade to the Colorado I would suggest the early establishment of a trading house at the highest point on the river known to be navigable, say at the junction of the Pasigona & Colorado, with a small force to protect it. [He went so far as to suggest conciliation with the Prairie Indians, who were the most troublesome of the Indian neighbors, and continued,]

As the government of Texas claims to extend its territory to the utmost limits of Santa Fe, it is desirable that the people should be brought under our direct political control. The great distance of Santa Fe from the government of Mexico has left that territory entirely dependent upon itself for protection, and the people only feel the authority of the political power thro the weight of taxation imposed by the central head. They are prepared to unite with us, and this is the favorable moment to cement the friendship they have offered. The revolutionary spirit is warm in New Mexico, and the people are determined to throw off the despotic yoke of the present government. We should at once demonstrate our sympathies with them.

I hope, if possibly in your power, that you will order an immediate military escort for a company of traders to Santa Fe, and that a portion if not the entire adventure may be undertaken by the government itself. Immense profits must result from it, and the introduction of 75 or 100 thousand dollars of specie from Santa Fe thro' the Colorado Valley will give confidence to individual enterprize and the route will soon be lined with traders able to protect themselves, who will introduce the riches of New Mexico into the lap of Texas. . . .<sup>9</sup>

It is a striking fact that the five commissioners charged with the location of the permanent seat of government came to the conclusion anticipated by Jones. I have found no direct connection between Jones and the commissioners, but it is unlikely that the harmony of his ideas with the report of the commissioners was accidental. Unfortunately there is no record of the instructions given to the commissioners by Lamar other than the statement of his secretary referred to above; hence, it is not possible to indicate how far the desirability of the point selected as a way station between Santa Fé and points on the Gulf was a part of the in-

<sup>9</sup>W. J. Jones to Lamar, February 8, 1839, *Lamar Papers*, No. 1049.

This letter is endorsed by Lamar, "Thos J Jones Bastrop 8th Feby 1839. Upon Santa Fee trade &c Received 20th Feby." This indicates a strange lack of knowledge of Jones' real name. The letter was autographed, "Wm. Jefferson Jones," but the first abbreviation is difficult of interpretation. Certainly Jones must have been little known by Lamar previous to this, though he became better known later.

structions. The commissioners left while Jones was in Houston, or shortly after, and there seems no doubt that there was a general understanding among the commissioners and the President that a location was to be selected favorable to the proposed occupation of New Mexico. The report of the commissioners, among other things, stated:

The Commissioners confidently anticipate the time when a great thoroughfare shall be established from Santa Fe to our Sea ports, and another from Red River to Matamoras, which two routs must almost of necessity intersect each other at this point. They look forward to the time when this city shall be the emporium of not only the productions of the rich soil of the San Saba, Puertentalis Hono and Pecan Bayo, but of all the Colorado and Brassos, as also the Produce of the rich mining country known to exist on those streams. They are satisfied that a truly National City could at no other point within the limits assigned them be reared up, not that no other sections of the Country are not equally fertile, but that no other combined so many and such varied advantages and beauties as the one in question. The imagination of even the romantic will not be disappointed on viewing the Valley of the Colorado, and the fertile and gracefully undulating woodlands and luxuriant Prairies at a distance from it. The most sceptical will not doubt its healthiness, and the citizens bosom must swell with honest pride when standing in the Portico of the Capitol of his Country he looks abroad upon a reigon worthy only of being the home of the brave and free. Standing on the juncture of the routs of Santa Fe and the Sea Coast, of Red River and Matamoras, looking with the same glance upon the green romantic Mountains, and the fertile and widely extended plains of his country, can a feeling of Nationality fail to arise in his bosom or could the fire of patriotism lie dormant under such circumstances.<sup>10</sup>

For a while Lamar seriously considered the sending of an immediate military expedition to Santa Fé. This would have been justified on the grounds that Texas was still technically at war with Mexico, though no actual hostilities had occurred since the Mexican defeat at San Jacinto. In March, 1839, he addressed the Harrisburg Volunteers on the defence of the frontier, and congratulated them on their prospects for "honorable station in the select Regiment which is to be placed under the command of Colonel Karnes in the anticipated expedition to Santa Fee."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Report of Seat of Government Commissioners, April 13, 1839, *MS. Seat of Government Papers*, Texas State Library.

<sup>11</sup>*Lamar Papers*, No. 1162.

Letters from correspondents also indicate that there was some activity looking toward such an expedition.<sup>12</sup> Lamar was unwilling, however, to adopt the suggestion of Jones that the Prairie Indians be conciliated, especially since he had repeatedly expressed himself as favoring their extermination or expulsion from the republic. And the warfare begun early in his administration continued until the close of 1840, leaving little opportunity to divert any of the forces for an expedition to Santa Fé.

It will be noticed that the letter of Jones mentioned a previous letter to the secretary of war on the subject of the Santa Fé trade, and the importance of securing it for Texas. It is interesting to notice that the secretary of war in his report, September 30, 1839, mentioned the fact that the government was constructing a military road from Red River to the presidio crossing of the Nueces river, and proposed the construction of a similar road from Austin to Santa Fé. He said that Santa Fé was situated about twelve miles east of the upper Rio Grande, and was included within the statutory limits of Texas. It was settled entirely by Mexicans, and never having been conquered by Texas was still under the Mexican government. The country between Austin and Santa Fé, he said, was wholly unoccupied save by roaming bodies of Indians. For many years the traders of the United States had carried on a successful commerce with Santa Fé, of the annual value of four or five million dollars. Santa Fé was not the consumer of all the goods, but was rather the depot for trade with the interior of Mexico. He thought that the trade might be diverted to Texas if a military road were constructed, since the distance from Santa Fé to Texas ports was much less than to St. Louis; and Texas would be the recipient of the vast profits realized. He suggested, also, that a military road would serve to conciliate the western part of the Texan territory, and the two sections would be bound closely together.<sup>13</sup>

Lamar, in his message to Congress, November 12, 1839, referred to this subject, and discussed the importance of the Santa Fé trade without recommending any action by Congress at that time.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup>J. S. Jones to Lamar, April 14, 1839, *Lamar Papers*, No. 1198; W. J. Jones to Lamar, April 15, 1839, *Ibid.*, No. 1199.

<sup>13</sup>Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 313.

<sup>14</sup>*Lamar Papers*, No. 1529.



Lamar was intensely interested in extending the trade of the republic. In his inaugural address in December, 1838, he had expressed himself in favor of free trade; and in the instructions to the various ministers sent to Europe, he always suggested the policy of offering favorable commercial privileges in return for recognition of independence. In February, 1839, he issued a proclamation, after Congress had passed an act to that effect, opening trade between the western settlements of Texas and the Mexicans on the Rio Grande.<sup>15</sup> This action was a result of the revolt of Canales against the centralists, and did not carry any recognition of Mexican rights to the east of the Rio Grande.

A considerable trade had developed between Santa Fé and St. Louis on one side, and between Santa Fé and Matamoras on the other. This had its beginning after the expedition of Pike, though it was not until 1821 or 1822 that any appreciable success attended the efforts of merchants to open trade—at the time that Stephen F. Austin left Missouri with his colonists and settled in Texas. In 1833 and 1834 the government of the United States found it necessary to give military aid to the expeditions on account of the hostility of the Indians.<sup>16</sup> In 1839 an effort was made to open direct trade between Van Buren, Arkansas, and Chihuahua, Mexico, an account of which appeared in the *Telegraph and Texas Register* on July 17, 1839, probably stimulating the interest of the government and people of Texas in trade with Mexico.

During the fall and winter of 1839-1840, the possibility and desirability of getting control of the Santa Fé trade was under discussion by the people and newspapers. The editor of *The Sentinel*, published at Austin, said that he had frequently been asked as to the feasibility of establishing direct communication with Santa Fé. He estimated that the distance from Austin to Santa Fé was about four hundred and fifty miles. The road, he said, was through a rich, rolling, well-watered country. The distance from Austin to the old San Saba fort was estimated at one hundred and twenty-five miles, and the writer said that the old Spanish road could be followed from Gonzales to that place. The Santa Fé road, it was stated, passed through a beautiful country

<sup>15</sup>*Lamar Papers*, No. 1079.

<sup>16</sup>Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies*, I, 24, 31.

at the headwaters of the Red River, where there was good grazing. A small force would be sufficient, as there were no enemies except the Comanches, and fifty well-armed men would suffice for protection against them. Finally, the Texan traders would have every advantage over those from St. Louis.<sup>17</sup>

About the time this was published, and just before it appeared in the *Telegraph and Texas Register*, William G. Dryden, who had spent a number of years in Santa Fé appeared in Texas. He was sent on April 1, 1840, to Lamar with a letter of introduction by William H. Jack of Brazoria.<sup>18</sup> Jack introduced him as a former officer in the Mexican service who was well acquainted in Santa Fé, Dryden's report of the conditions in Santa Fé must have been favorable, as we find Lamar issuing an address to "The Citizens of Santa Fee" two weeks later.

In this letter, which was probably carried to Santa Fé by Dryden, he saluted the citizens of Santa Fé as "Friends and Compatriots." He referred to the revolution which had emancipated Texas from the "thralldom of Mexican domination." The revolution was forced upon them by circumstances too imperative to be resisted. The Anglo-American population of Texas had left the comforts and the enlightened liberty of their own country, and had migrated to Texas under the guarantee of the Constitution of 1824. They had witnessed many civil wars, and had hoped that calamities would harmonize the government, and teach the authorities of Mexico that frequent political changes and domestic discords were destructive of the prosperity and character of a people. Texas had resolved to be free, when a military despotism arose with the forcible abrogation of the Constitution of 1824. Impelled by the highest considerations, which a benignant providence had sanctified by conferring an unexampled prosperity upon them, they had asserted and achieved their independence, and had entered the great family of nations. They had been recognized by "the illustrious Government of the United States, and by the ancient Monarchy of France," and other powers of Europe were ready to extend the right hand of fellowship. Their natural resources were in rapid progress of development; the population was increasing by numerous accessions from Europe

<sup>17</sup>*Telegraph and Texas Register*, April 8, 1840.

<sup>18</sup>Jack to Lamar, April 1, 1840, *Lamar Papers*, No. 1757.

and the United States, and their commerce was extending with a power and celerity seldom equalled in the history of nations.

All this was introductory to what follows. "Under these auspicious circumstances," he said,

we tender to you, a full participation in all our blessings. The great River of the North, which you inhabit, is the natural and convenient boundary of our territory, and we shall take great pleasure in hailing you as fellow-citizens, members of our Young Republic, and co-aspirants with us for all the glory of establishing a new and happy and free Nation. Our constitution is as liberal as a rational and enlightened regard to human infirmities will safely permit. It confers equal political privileges on all; tolerates all Religions without distinction, and guarantees an even uniform and impartial administration of the laws.

He hoped the communication would be received by them and the public authorities in the same spirit in which it was dictated. And then he announced that if nothing intervened to change his resolution, he would despatch in time to arrive "in your section of Country about the ninth of September proxima, one or more commissioners, gentlemen of worth and confidence to explain more minutely the condition of our country, of the seaboard and the co-relative interests which so emphatically recommend and ought perpetually to cement the perfect union and identity of Santa Fee and Texas." The commissioners were to be accompanied by a military escort for the purpose of repelling any hostile Indians that might infest the passage, and with the further view of ascertaining the opening of a safe and convenient route of communication between the two sections of country, "which being strongly assimilated in interest, we hope to see united in friendship and consolidated under a common Government." Until the arrival of those commissioners he was appointing some of their own citizens, William G. Dryden, John Rowland, and William Workman, to whom the views of the Texan government had been communicated, to confer with them upon the subject matter of the communication.<sup>19</sup>

In spite of this assurance, no action was taken to carry out the purposes expressed in the letter. For the whole of the summer and until October, all the Texan forces were engaged in warfare with the Comanches. Besides, a total lack of funds prevented

<sup>19</sup>Lamar to the Citizens of Santa Fé, April 14, 1840, *Lamar Papers*, 1773.

the carrying out of the policy of Lamar at that time. Under these circumstances, he appealed to Congress, which met in November, to supply the funds and take the necessary steps to bring Santa Fé under the political and commercial control of Texas.

The Congress had been elected on an issue of retrenchment, and was by no means warm to the plans of Lamar from the beginning. Besides, Sam Houston had succeeded in making himself a leader of the anti-administration forces in Congress, and, as will be seen, was able to defeat appropriations for the project.

On November 9, 1840, Representative Usher, a friend of the administration, introduced a resolution requesting the committee on the state of the republic to take into consideration the propriety and expediency of passing a law with the view to inform the inhabitants of Santa Fé of their privileges as citizens of the republic of Texas.<sup>20</sup> On the same day Representative Miller of Austin, a friend of Houston's, introduced a resolution instructing the committee on finance to inquire into the expediency of laying off and setting apart so much of the public domain intermediate and equidistant between Austin and Santa Fé, as might be adapted to the establishment of a colony of actual settlers, with a view to opening, facilitating, and securing the trade of Santa Fé.<sup>21</sup> Out of this second resolution grew the notorious "Franco-Texienne" bill, which was ardently supported by the French minister, Saligny, and the opponents of the administration, led by Sam Houston. As this was an alternative measure to the policy of the administration, a somewhat full examination is necessary.

This bill proposed to create a corporation headed by two Frenchmen, Jean Pierre Hippolyte Basterreche, and Pierre Francois de Hassauex, which contracted to introduce within the republic eight thousand families by January 1, 1849. For this purpose three million acres of land were granted to the corporation, on the condition that all the terms of the contract were carried out. The land was to be divided as follows: 512,000 acres fronting one hundred miles on the Rio Grande, above the Presidio road, and eight miles in depth; 192,000 acres on the Nueces, above the Presidio road, on both sides of the river, six miles in width and twenty-one in length; 194,000 acres on the Rio Frio; 128,000 acres ex-

<sup>20</sup>5 Tex. Cong., 1 Sess., *House Journal*, 45.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 43.

tending from the Arroyo Seco to the Arroyo Uvalde; 128,000 acres on the Guadalupe above the mouth of Sabine Creek; 1,000,000 acres, in three tracts between the Colorado and San Saba; 192,000 acres from the Colorado to the Pasegona river, three miles and one hundred miles along the old Santa Fé road; 294,000 acres on Red River, next above the Cross Timbers, fronting forty-six miles and two miles in depth; 50,000 acres at the head of the Nueces; 50,000 acres at the head of the Colorado; 50,000 acres on the Aguila river; 50,000 acres near the source of the Little river; 50,000 acres on the Brazos, thirty miles above the Palo Pinto creek; 50,000 acres on the Noland river, fifty miles above its mouth; 50,000 acres in the forks of the Trinity, west of the Cross Timbers. The company was also to maintain a line of military posts from a point thirty miles above the town of Presidio, and extending to the Red River, at some point near the Cross Timbers. This line was to consist of twenty posts, which were to be maintained for a period of twenty years. They were also to keep up lines of communication between the posts, and were to appoint a sufficient number of geologists, mineralogists, and botanists to explore the whole country and report on all mines found. They were to open and work all mines found, and give fifty per cent of the proceeds to the Republic of Texas.

Practical autonomy was granted to the colonists by the provision that they might make by-laws not in violation of the Texas Constitution. Another attractive feature from the standpoint of the colonists was that the lands were to be exempt from taxation until January 1, 1845.<sup>22</sup>

This remarkable bill actually passed the House of Representatives, and came near to passing the Senate. It is likely that it would have passed the upper House except for the opposition of Lamar.<sup>23</sup> The defeat of this bill aroused the bitter opposition of Saligny to the Government, and unfortunately, he was abetted by the opponents of the administration in denouncing those who voted against the bill.

President Lamar had been in poor health during a good part of his administration, and on December 12, he had become so ill that he found it necessary to apply to Congress for a leave of

<sup>22</sup>*Austin City Gazette*, July 21, 1841; Brown, *History of Texas*, II, 187.

<sup>23</sup>See Mayfield to Saligny, March 29, 1841, and Mayfield to McIntosh, May 12, 1841, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, III, 1315; 1326.

absence so that he could go to New Orleans for treatment. He did not return to his duties until February, 1841, after Congress adjourned. In his absence, however, the Senate passed the administration bill providing for the opening of communications with Santa Fé.<sup>24</sup> This bill was received by the House on January 15, whereupon Representative Murchison introduced a substitute bill authorizing the President to raise volunteers to make an expedition to Santa Fé. This principle was accepted by the committee on the state of the republic, and five days later was reported to the House as a substitute for the Senate measure. On January 26 the House defeated the Senate bill by a vote of sixteen to nineteen, and passed the substitute measure by a majority of two, Houston working against both bills.<sup>25</sup> The Senate failed to agree to the substitute measure, and the session came to a close without legislative approval of the expedition to Santa Fé, but apparently the principle was accepted by both Houses, and they were only unable to agree to the particular method to be used in carrying out the project.

Lamar returned to the Capital in February, 1841, and immediately began preparations to despatch an expedition to Santa Fé in spite of the failure of Congress to make provision for it. He issued a long proclamation to the people of Santa Fé, calling upon them peacefully to accept Texan rule, and guaranteeing them the privileges mentioned in his letter of April, 1840.<sup>26</sup> He appointed Hugh McLeod military commander of the expedition, and, since Congress had failed to make appropriations for the regular army, authorized him to raise volunteers to accompany the expedition. He took upon himself the authority to order the secretary of the treasury to instruct the comptroller to open on his books an appropriation for fitting out the Santa Fé expedition,<sup>27</sup> and Major George T. Howard was sent to New Orleans to purchase supplies.

The volunteers for the expedition began to arrive in Austin early in May, and went into camp on Brushy Creek, about twenty miles north of Austin.<sup>28</sup> The party was collecting for the next

<sup>24</sup>Tex. Cong. 1 Sess., *House Journal*, 509.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 518, 555, 610.

<sup>26</sup>A copy of the proclamation is in *Lamar Papers*, No. 1942.

<sup>27</sup>Lamar to Chalmers, Secretary of the Treasury, March 24, 1841, Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 323, note.

<sup>28</sup>*Austin City Gazette*, May 12, 1841.

month, the last group leaving Austin on June 18, accompanied by President Lamar, and the secretary of the treasury, J. G. Chalmers; and on June 21, the whole body set out on the long march to Santa Fé.

The expedition consisted of a military escort consisting of two hundred and seventy volunteers under the command of General Hugh McLeod, and about fifty other persons, consisting of General McLeod's staff, merchants, tourists, servants, and the civil commissioners who were to take over the civil government of the province in case of success.<sup>29</sup>

The commissioners, William G. Cooke, J. Antonio Navarro, Richard F. Brenham, and William G. Dryden, being expected to take over the civil affairs, the instructions of the state department were directed to them. According to these instructions, the commissioners were appointed to accompany the military expedition about to start for Santa Fé, and they were to have the chief directions of the expedition. The expedition had been organized by the President, the acting secretary of state said, for the purpose of opening a communication with that portion of the republic known as Santa Fé, and of closely uniting it with the rest of the republic, "so that the Supremacy of our constitution and laws may be asserted equally over the entire tract of country embraced within our limits; but as that portion is inhabited by a people strangers to our institutions and to our system of Government, speaking a different language, and deriving their origin from an alien source, whose religion, laws, manners and customs, all differ so widely from our own, the greatest circumspection will be necessary, in making known to that people the object of your mission, on your first arrival in Santa fe and subsequently in conducting your intercourse with them."

The great object of the President, he said, was to attach the people of the district of Santa Fé to the Texas system of government, and to create in their minds a reverence for the Texan Constitution; and to spread among them a spirit of liberty and independence, which would alone qualify them for good citizens, under a government, the very existence of which, depended upon the will of the people.

The President had no illusions as to the possible manner of

<sup>29</sup>Kendall, *Texan Santa Fé Expedition*, 72.

reception of the expedition; and the commissioners were instructed to conduct themselves with caution, and to require the same of the military command entrusted to their charge. It was expected that they would meet with opposition from narrow-minded persons, but the President believed that patience and good judgment would accomplish their purpose.

Their first object upon entering the city of Santa Fé was to attempt to get possession of all the public property; but they were to hesitate to use force if the property were not surrendered peaceably. "The people of Santa fe are our fellow citizens," said the Secretary of State,

and it cannot be long before they will be fully incorporated with us, partaking of all the advantages and benefits which we enjoy, under our form of government. . . . If they can be brought with their own free will and consent, to submit quietly and cheerfully to an incorporation with us, acknowledging themselves a constituent portion of the Republic, and setting into operation our constitution and laws, then may we confidently expect of them, fidelity and patriotism; but if they are awed into submission by threats, or still worse if they are driven to it by the application of Military power, the disastrous consequences that must inevitably follow, cannot well be foreseen.

The commissioners were to be left largely to their own resources in accomplishing the purposes of the government, but several arguments were submitted for their guidance. In the first place, they were to assure the people of Santa Fé of the protection of the government in the enjoyment of life, liberty, trial by jury, freedom from forced loans, and from all taxes levied without their consent; at the same time they were to hold before their eyes the folly of resistance. Emphasis was to be placed on the fact that by coming under the government of Texas they were to have equal representation in Congress as based upon population.

In case all obstacles were overcome, after taking possession of the custom-houses, books, money, archives, they were to appoint such persons as they might think proper for the government of the city; and were advised to appoint local men as far as possible. After familiarizing themselves with the conditions, they were to propose the sending of three commissioners to Austin, who were to have a seat in the Congress, with the right to dis-



cuss any proposition coming before the body, but without a right to vote.

In view of the fact that some of the Texan politicians of the day, and many people in the United States, understood it to be Lamar's intention to conquer with a force of two hundred and seventy men a province of Mexico lying hundreds of miles from the frontier of his own government, the following quotation from the official instructions is inserted, which indicates that no such purpose was in his mind. After stating that the foregoing instructions were based on the supposition that no force would be opposed by the citizens of Santa Fé, and that in case of opposition the commissioners must rely upon their own discretion, the instructions continued:

The President anxious as he is to have our National flag acknowledged in Santa fe, does not consider it expediant at this time to force it upon that portion of the Republic. If the Mexican authorities are prepared to defend the place with arms, and if you can satisfy yourselves that they will be supported by the mass of the people, no good result can come from risking a battle; for if our arms are successful, a strong Military force would be necessary to hold possession of the place, the cost of keeping which, to say nothing of other objections equally forcible, would of itself be sufficient; and if they are unfortunate, the evils that would flow from it are sufficiently apparent. In this case therefore, you will not be authorized to risk a battle.

It was to be expected that much would be made of the commercial possibilities of the expedition, yet we find that little attention was paid to that subject. "As valuable as their trade is," said the instructions,

and solicitous as the President is to open its advantages to the citizens of this country, he yet owes a paramount duty to the constitution, and has directed me to instruct you, that you are to make no arrangement, stipulation or agreement whatever with the inhabitants, for the admission of Texan goods into that District of country, by which Texan Citizens will be required to pay any duties to them. We claim the jurisdiction, and consequently the right to demand the revenue, and if we cannot enforce our right, we must at least do nothing to impair it. . . . The object of the expedition being to conciliate the people of Santa fe, to incorporate them with us, and to secure to our citizens all the benefits arising from the valuable trade carried on with them. It may be necessary to diminish the tariff to a

still lower rate to effect these objects; but nothing short of necessity will justify any interference with the rates established by Congress, and of this necessity the collector of customs must be the Judge.<sup>30</sup>

At the same time that the above instructions were given to the four commissioners, a separate list was given to Cooke, who was to be resident commissioner and have charge of the government after the other commissioners had returned to Texas. These instructions constituted Cooke the ruler of Santa Fé under the laws of the Republic of Texas, and of course were to be effective only in case the expedition accomplished its purpose.<sup>31</sup>

As I have said, the last detachment of volunteers and guests left Austin for the camp on Brushy Creek. Among these was George Wilkins Kendall, editor of the New Orleans *Picayune*, who had decided to join the expedition when he became acquainted with Major George T. Howard, who was purchasing supplies in New Orleans, and who was invited to join the expedition as a guest of the government. Kendall has given us an extensive account of the trip from its beginning to his release from a Mexican prison.<sup>32</sup> Also with this last detachment rode the President of the republic. During their ride to Brushy Creek from Austin they stopped for lunch in the middle of the day, and Kendall was very much impressed by the fact that Lamar groomed his own horse and cooked his own dinner. "There was a specimen of Republican simplicity," he said, "the chief magistrate of a nation cooking his own dinner and grooming his own horse." He then paid this tribute to Lamar: "In all my intercourse with General Lamar I ever found him a courteous and honorable gentleman, possessing a brilliant intellect, which has been highly cultivated; and if Texas ever had a warm and untiring friend, it was and is Mirabeau B. Lamar."<sup>33</sup>

Lamar and his party spent the night in camp, reviewed the various companies, and delivered an address to the assembled party, and then returned to Austin. The expedition got under way June 21, a month later than had been originally planned.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>30</sup>Acting Secretary of State Roberts to William G. Cooke, etc., June 15, 1841. Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 737-743.

<sup>31</sup>Roberts to Cooke, June 15, 1841, in *Ibid.*, 743-747.

<sup>32</sup>*Narrative of the Texan Santa Fé Expedition.*

<sup>33</sup>Kendall, *Narrative*, I, 69.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 71.

In writing a biography of Lamar, we might perhaps leave the expedition here; for the group of men who set out with such confidence and so blithely on June 21 were not heard of again until several months after the close of Lamar's administration, and then they were prisoners of the Mexicans, on their way to Mexico City. But the failure of the expedition was made the excuse for bitter attacks on Lamar, and since historians have accepted the more or less superficial judgments of the time, it will be well to give a somewhat complete history of the expedition, and try to arrive at the causes for its failure.

The first incident after leaving that contributed to the failure of the enterprise occurred only a few days after departure from the camp on Brushy Creek. Anticipating a journey of only six weeks or two months, provisions had been prepared for that length of time; but the long delay in getting under way had caused the consumption of the cattle to a large extent, and when the party pitched camp on Little River, June 24, only about sixty miles from Austin, it was found necessary to send back for more beef cattle. The main body waited five days for these supplies, and, in the meantime, continued to consume the provisions which were not too plentiful.<sup>35</sup>

They left the camp on Little River on June 29, and traveling almost due northward, were almost a month in traversing the valley of the Brazos. On July 21, they came to the Cross Timbers, about two hundred miles from their starting place. About ten days were consumed in cutting their way through the Cross Timbers, the wagons of the merchants which accompanied the expedition making necessary roads of some description. At this point, it was necessary to cross the Brazos, which was accomplished with much difficulty.

The purpose of the leaders was to go north to the Red River, and to follow that river to its source, whence only a short distance would remain to Santa Fé, and that along the well marked trail from Santa Fé to St. Louis. The distance was much greater than a direct route, but they were unable to secure guides who knew the country to the northwest. It was to prove that they were no more fortunate in securing a guide for the longer journey. After leaving the Cross Timbers, July 31, their next destination was

<sup>35</sup>Kendall, *Narrative*, I, 85.

Red River. They soon came to the Wichita River which they mistook for the Red River, and followed it for several days, until they found slightly to the south, the headwaters of the Brazos, the river which they had crossed a month before. When this was discovered, a detachment was sent northward to explore for the Red River, and it was located about seventy-five miles north of where the main body was encamped.<sup>36</sup> From this point I shall quote freely from the official report of William G. Cooke, the resident commissioner.

After many unexpected delays and embarrassments, that retarded our march beyond the time anticipated for our arrival in Santa Fé, we at length on the 29th August, reached a point on the Palo Duro a tributary of Red River beyond which there was apparently no further means of progressing with the wagons accompanying the Command. Previous to this time, on the 11th, Mr. Howland our guide, was sent forward with two men, bearing a communication to Mr. Dryden our colleague in Santa Fé; we being at the time under the impression that we were within one hundred miles of that city—judging from the information of a Mexican whom we had also employed as a guide, who was a native of Taos and appeared to be familiar with the country through which we were passing. A few days after the departure of Howland the Mexican suddenly deserted in company with a private—an Italian named Brignoli. On our arrival at the Palo Duro the Commissary reported but five days ration of beef, other rations exhausted—the country in advance of us appeared impassable for wagons—and Indians in large numbers had made their appearance in the vicinity of our camp. Under these embarrassing circumstances, when further progress with the entire command and train seemed impracticable, it was concluded that the undersigned, and a majority of the Commission should proceed forward with one-third of the escort to the nearest settlement to procure supplies and guide to furnish and conduct the troops into New Mexico. We left camp accordingly on the 31st August with 75 soldiers under the command of Capt Sutton—who with the merchants and others formed a body of 97 men. It was our expectation on leaving camp that we should arrive at settlements or strike a road that had been described to us leading to San Miguel, in five days march—but we saw no human being nor any sign of civilization until we reached the Moro a branch of Red River on the 11th Sept, where we met with some Mexican traders—they informed us that we were about 80 miles distant from San Miguel and that there was a wagon road leading from that place to within

<sup>36</sup>Kendall, *Narrative*, *passim*.

a short distance of our camp. We immediately sent back two of them with orders to Genl. McLeod to destroy the baggage wagons and follow us with all despatch. We continued our march and on the 14th Mr. G. Vanness our Secretary was despatched ahead to San Miguel to communicate with Mr. Dryden whom we expected to meet there and to gain some information respecting the condition of the country—he was also directed to make arrangements for procuring supplies—he was accompanied by Maj. G. T. Howard, Capt W. P. Lewis, Mr. Fitzgerald a merchant of San Antonio and Mr. Kendall of New Orleans.

The main body were forced to travel slowly on account of the condition of their horses, and arrived on the Pecos on September 15 at a small town named Anton Chico, twenty miles from San Miguel. Here they were visited by a Mexican officer accompanied by seventy armed men, who informed them that the Governor of New Mexico was advancing to meet them with a large force, and ordered them to surrender their arms. "We declined holding any communication with him in regard to the object of our visit. . . . but informed him that we came with no hostile intentions toward the citizens of the country and positively refused to lay down our arms."

They decided to remain at Anton Chico until they had received some intelligence from Van Ness, who was supposed to have proceeded to meet the governor. On the 16th they had another interview with the Mexican officer, and told him that unless they received some news from Van Ness by the following morning, they would proceed to San Miguel. The officer said that he would send a courier to Van Ness and order his return, and said that on the following day he would cross the river with his men and encamp near the Texans in order to prove their friendliness. "Up to this time," said the report, "no event had occurred that could justly excite feelings of hostility against us among the people we had met who had been treated by our men with the utmost courtesy, the provisions we had received had been paid for at double their customary value."

On the following day the officer called on them with an express from the governor requesting them to pause until that functionary could arrive. He stated that the governor was approaching with five thousand men and would be in Anton Chico the following day. In the meantime the Mexican forces began to take posi-

tions favorable to attack, and the Texans assumed a posture of defence, expecting every moment to be attacked by the forces under Salezar. "There was no longer any doubt as to the intentions of the Mexicans," continued the report,

and we were momentarily expecting a conflict, when Capt Lewis galloped over to us in company with Don Manuel Chavis kinsman and confidential agent of the Governor with authority to demand our surrender upon the following terms—That we should immediately give up our arms and remain at Anton Chico as prisoners of war on parole, until such time as supplies could be obtained for the subsistence of our troops in returning to Texas—that on no condition could we be allowed to proceed further into Mexican territory, but that as soon as provisions were procured we should be escorted beyond the frontier, where the arms, horses and private property of the officers and men should be restored to them.—These terms were offered by Mr. Chavis, with the most solemn pledges for their fulfillment, seconded by the assurances of Capt Lewis in whom at that time we reposed the utmost confidence.

And then follows the story of Lewis's treachery. Lewis informed the commissioners that he had gone with Van Ness and Howard to execute the orders of the commissioners, when all three were surrounded and taken prisoners by the Mexicans. They were about to be shot when some explanations Lewis made caused the Mexicans to release them; and they were conducted to the governor. The governor, Lewis said, released him and sent him back on parole. He stated that the people of the country were all arrayed in arms against the invaders, and greatly exasperated against them on account of the false reports that had been circulated as to the object of the expedition by the deserter Brignoli. He then told them that he had left the governor within twelve miles of Anton Chico with two thousand troops, and that he would shortly be joined by two thousand more, all well armed and disciplined. As a result of this, and on account of his argument that the lives of the whole party depended upon surrendering their arms at once, "Under these circumstances," said Cooke's report,

without provisions for our men, our horses broken down by long and weary marches, deprived of any hope of aid from our main body by a distance of two hundred miles, with an enemy before us with more than five times our numbers and should we be victorious in the present fight of which we had no doubt, the prospect

of being attacked by several thousand fresh troops in less than twenty four hours—in this situation and considering that we were specially instructed to avoid hostilities should the people themselves be opposed to us, we concluded the best and most prudent course we could adopt was an acceptance of the terms proposed, and consequently we surrendered.

Governor Armijo arrived at Anton Chico on the 18th with less than one thousand men, and immediately distributed the arms of the Texans among the Mexicans, and started the Texans on their long march to Mexico City. At the same time he moved forward to meet the body which had been left behind on August 31 under General McLeod. Efforts had been made to inform McLeod of the fate of the advance party of ninety-seven men, but they failed, and McLeod received the same treatment as the others, being forced to surrender one hundred and eighty-two men, who were sent after the first group to Mexico City.<sup>37</sup>

It is not my purpose to follow the prisoners on their painful journey on foot to the city of Mexico, nor to follow the negotiations for their release. It is sufficient here to say that in the spring, after seven months in prison, through the intervention of the foreign ministers in Mexico, all the prisoners who could show themselves to be citizens of the United States or some European country were released. The Texans, with the exception of Navarro, who was bitterly hated by Santa Anna, were released in the summer, and by the close of 1842 most of them were again in Texas.<sup>38</sup> I shall, however, examine the various causes given for the failure of the expedition, and consider the criticisms and defence of the administration for undertaking the enterprise.

For the sake of clearness let me summarize at this point the developments connected with the sending of the expedition. The Texans claimed, partly as a result of the treaty of May 14, 1836, with Santa Anna, and partly on account of a statute, passed in December, 1836, that the boundary extended along the Rio Grande to its source, which would include Santa Fé. Lamar, on coming into office, was advised by his friends and received favorably their

<sup>37</sup>W. G. Cooké and R. F. Brenham to Secretary of State, November 9, 1841. *Santa Fé Papers*. This report was sent from Allende, Chihuahua, Mexico, as they were on their way to Mexico City. It did not arrive in Texas until February of the following year, after Lamar's term of office had expired.

<sup>38</sup>Garrison, *Texas*, 246.

advice to undertake a politico-military expedition to Santa Fé, partly for the purpose of establishing commercial connections, but also for the purpose of establishing political control over that part of New Mexico. Various other interests prevented the undertaking until the summer of 1841. In the meantime, however, Lamar had been in communication with men who had lived at Santa Fé, and had received assurances that the populace were very much dissatisfied with the rule of Armijo, the governor, and would welcome a Texan force. As a result of this he sent a letter to the citizens of Santa Fé, and appointed three commissioners to prepare the ground for the coming of the Texans. He attempted to secure some authorization from Congress for the expedition during the session of 1840-1841, but due to an economizing spirit, and on account of the opposition of Houston, and as a result of a difference of opinion as to how military aid should be extended to the merchants, nothing was done by Congress. In spite of this, Lamar called for volunteers, ordered an appropriation opened on the books of the comptroller for fitting out the expedition, and on June 21, 1841, it left with his blessing, but to be taken captive in September, before ever they reached Santa Fé.

Nothing having been heard of the expedition when the next Congress met in November, 1841, a reaction had set in, and the members were free in their criticism of the President's action. The House of Representatives appointed a select committee to investigate the whole subject. This committee reported on December 6, and found that the President had violated the Constitution in ordering money paid out of the treasury without an appropriation by Congress, and that his action in enlisting an army of volunteers without the sanction of Congress was in violation of the Constitution. They found that for the expenses of the expedition \$89,549.69 had been expended.<sup>39</sup> The quarter-master-general, on the other hand, reported the sum of \$78,421.51.<sup>40</sup>

The committee did not find that any of the rights of Mexico had been overridden, and there is every evidence that it was considered purely as a matter of domestic concern, and the question was one merely of constitutionality. Houston held the same view,

<sup>39</sup>*Austin City Gazette*, December 15, 1841.

<sup>40</sup>*Army Papers*, 1840-1841. Texas State Library.



as instanced by his letter to Santa Anna, March 21, 1842. In this letter he defended the claims to the Rio Grande as a western boundary, and insisted that the prisoners should be released, since it was no concern of Santa Anna. At the same time, he said that Lamar had acted unconstitutionally in sending the expedition without the approval of Congress.<sup>41</sup>

This criticism was probably justified. It must be remembered, however, that Lamar had considered sending the expedition on his own account ever since the matter first came into his mind, and he did not consider the approval of Congress necessary. Normally the regular army was under his command, and could be sent anywhere in the republic that he wished to send it; and he conceived it to be a legitimate use of the army to protect merchants in opening up trade which all public men favored. It was the failure of Congress to make any provision for the regular army in the session of 1840-1841, that made it necessary for Lamar to take the matter into his own hands. He justified himself in this, however, by saying that the principle had been accepted by both houses, and it was only the details on which they could not agree.

Assuming that the claims of Texas to the Rio Grande were just, and nobody in Texas denied it at that time, was Lamar justified in his assumption that the people of Santa Fé would accept Texas sovereignty without a struggle? The instructions to the commissioners prove that Lamar had no grandiose schemes of conquest, and that he was not under the illusion that he was able at that distance to maintain control over New Mexico in case there was resistance on the part of the people of New Mexico themselves. The whole expedition was planned on the assumption that the people of Santa Fé would welcome the Texans. And Lamar was not alone in this assumption. The revolt of 1837-1838 against the central authorities, and the complaints which had come to Texas concerning the rule of Armijo, who had put down the revolt, together with the assurances of Dryden, who was in Texas in 1840, convinced the people of Texas that no difficulty would be encountered in taking possession of Santa Fé. "The universal impression in Texas was," says Kendall,

that the inhabitants of Santa Fé were anxious to throw off a yoke,

<sup>41</sup>Houston to Santa Anna, March 21, 1842, *Niles Register*, LXII, 98.

which was not only galling, but did not of right belong to them, and rally under the "lone star" banner; and events which have since transpired, and which I shall refer to hereafter, have convinced me that such was the feeling of the population. Should any opposition be made to the peaceable entry of the Texan pioneers, it was thought that it would come from the few regular troops always stationed at Santa Fé by the government of Mexico; and this force would have easily been put down if a large majority of the residents were in favor of such a course.

William G. Dryden, who had been in Austin in March and April, 1840, returned to Santa Fé on September 17, and immediately began holding conferences with the people and governor of Santa Fé. On March 10, 1841, he wrote:

Ever since I arrived on the 17th of last Septr., we have been looking for some news from Texas—Because every American, and more than two thirds of the Mexicans, and all the Pueblo Indians are with us heart and soul; and whenever they have heard of your sending Troops, there has been rejoicing: and indeed I have talked many times with the Governor, and he says he would be glad to see the day of your arrival in this country, as he feels well assured that no aid will be sent from below, as they have no means, and he himself will make no resistance

I assured all my friends you would send last fall—I now have pledged myself, this summer; and I shall never lose hope as long as life shall last. I trust, if all things are right, before you receive this, the force will be under march, and near here. It will but be a trip of pleasure.<sup>42</sup>

This letter did not reach Lamar until August, after the expedition had left, but indicates that this man who had lived long among them thought the people of Santa Fé would welcome the Texan expedition.

An interesting testimony to the same effect is contained in a letter of an American Santa Fé trader to the *St. Louis Bulletin* in the fall of 1841. The writer related some of the incidents of the trip which he had just completed from Santa Fé, and with regard to the Texan expedition said:

No news had been received at the time of the departure of the Texan expedition. A ready submission on the part of the inhabitants is to be anticipated; but the number sent from Texas, with-

<sup>42</sup>Dryden to Lamar, March 10, 1841, *Santa Fé Papers*, Texas State Library; *Austin City Gazette*, August 25, 1841.

out reinforcements, is entirely too small to retain possession of the country. Should they arrive at all in Santa Fé it is said they must suffer for want of supplies, as great scarcity of food in that quarter is looked for for the coming winter.<sup>43</sup>

Unquestionably the reception accorded to the expedition was not in accordance with the hopes or expectations of the Texans, of Dryden, and of the anonymous American writer. Was this due to the fact that the observers misunderstood the attitude of the people of Santa Fé, and that there was never the willingness to change allegiance that was ascribed to them; or was it due to a change in sentiment before the Texans arrived, and before the agents in Santa Fé could communicate to the authorities of Texas? Both were partly true, it seems. Apparently no secret was made of the plans of the Texans, either in Texas, or by the commissioners residing in Santa Fé; so ample opportunity was given for counter-preparations in case the Mexican government opposed Texan occupation of Santa Fé. Dryden had been discussing the subject since September, 1840, and there had been ample time for Armijo to communicate with his home government; but in case the governor were disloyal, the central authorities had ample opportunity to learn of the project from other sources.

On the day after the Santa Fé party took their departure from the camp on Brushy Creek, Rafael Uribe, an emissary of General Mariano Arista, commander of the Northern Army of Mexico, arrived in Austin with a letter from his commander to "Mr. Mirabeau Lamar." The substance of this letter was that Arista was anxious to come to some agreement with the Texan authorities with regard to the border brigandage which was taking place. Lamar refused to receive this emissary because the letter was improperly addressed, but he took the opportunity of sending two commissioners to the camp of Arista empowered to treat on the subject.<sup>44</sup> The rejected commissioner was able to learn of the departure of the Santa Fé expedition, and to give information to his government regarding it. Governor Armijo and the other authorities had been advised that an invasion from Texas was probable, and after the departure of McLeod and his party, special warnings had been sent from the city of Mexico ordering him to keep a constant look-

<sup>43</sup>Copied from *St. Louis Bulletin* in *Niles Register*, LXI, 100.

<sup>44</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.* II, 748.

out for the party. Reinforcements were promised him in case of need.<sup>45</sup>

Twitchell is of the opinion that while some dissatisfaction did exist among the native people owing to the official abuses of Armijo, still the great majority of New Mexicans were not ready to hail the Texans as deliverers; and naturally Armijo, who was well settled in power himself and left to his own devices by the central authorities, was opposed to any change of government. As a consequence, every precaution was taken, and among the common classes the Texans were represented as being a "choice assortment of reckless and desperate men, from whom nothing other than pillage, murder and outrage could be expected."<sup>46</sup> That the governor should be averse to accepting Texan control and giving up his own office is entirely reasonable; but I cannot accept the view of Mr. Twitchell that there was not a large majority of the people of Santa Fé willing if not anxious to change to Texan sovereignty.

It will be recalled that Dryden wrote to Lamar on March 10, and April 18, 1841, showing with what favor his mission had been received, and with what enthusiasm the people anticipated the coming of the Texans. Kendall, who with the advance guard was taken prisoner before arriving in Santa Fé, was convinced that the great majority of the people were anxious for the success of the Texans, and that the failure was due to fortuitous circumstances over which the Texan authorities had no control. I feel constrained to quote in full the explanation given by Kendall for the failure of the enterprise.

In the first place, the expedition began its march too late in the season by at least six weeks. Had it left Austin on the 1st of May, the grass would have been much better, and we should have had little difficulty in finding good water both for ourselves and cattle. In the second place, we were disappointed in obtaining a party of the Lipan Indians as guide, and were consequently obliged to take a route some three hundred miles out of the way, and in many places extremely difficult of travel. Thirdly, the government of Texas did not furnish wagons and oxen enough to transport the goods of the merchants, and this, as a matter of course, caused tedious delays. Fourthly, cattle enough on the hoof were not provided, even with the second supply sent for by the com-

<sup>45</sup>Twitchell, *Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 74.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 74.

missioners from Little River. Again, the distance was vastly greater than we had anticipated in our widest and wildest calculations, owing to which circumstance, and an improvident waste of provisions while in the buffalo range, we found ourselves upon half allowance in the very middle of our long journey—a privation which weakened, dispirited, and rendered the men unfit for duty. The Indians also annoyed us much, by their harassing and continual attempts to cut off our small parties and steal our horses. Finally, the character of the governor of New Mexico was far from being understood, and his power was underrated by all. General Lamar's estimate of the views and feelings of the people of Santa Fé and the vicinity was perfectly correct; not a doubt can exist that they all were and are anxious to throw off the oppressive yoke of Armijo, and come under the liberal institutions of Texas; but the governor found us divided into small parties, broken down by long marches and want of food, discovered a traitor among us, too, and taking advantage of these circumstances, his course was plain and his conquest easy.<sup>47</sup>

Granting that there was sufficient evidence of the friendly feeling of the people of Santa Fé, there is still sufficient grounds, even among the causes of failure listed by Kendall, for serious criticism of Lamar for undertaking the enterprise. It would seem that a careful executive would have so planned the expedition that the causes contributing to failure would be reduced to a minimum. Why did the expedition not start by the first of May? It was intended by the President that it should, and the delay was caused by the slowness with which men volunteered for the expedition. Why was not more known as to the distance? The actual distance in an air line from Austin to Santa Fé was only a little less than a thousand miles, and the indirect route taken by the Texans was near thirteen hundred. Nobody in Texas at that time thought it was more than five hundred miles, however, and Lamar can hardly be blamed for adopting the universal view. Jefferson purchased Louisiana with less knowledge of that territory than Lamar possessed of the upper Rio Grande. The failure to provide sufficient supplies is natural when we consider the mistaken idea as to the distance. It does seem that Lamar should have known enough of the character of the Mexicans not to place too much confidence on the word of one of their rulers, and for this failure he was justly criticised.

<sup>47</sup>Kendall, *Texan Santa Fé Expedition*, I, 365-366.

Lamar seems to have had a single-track mind, and when once he became convinced that an expedition to Santa Fé should be undertaken for the two-fold purpose of bringing that region under subjection to Texas and securing the valuable trade for Texas, he was unable to consider the effect of success or failure on the relations of Texas with Mexico. In fact, it seems that he considered the question as entirely foreign to the interests of Mexico, and even while he was preparing the expedition, he was sending a minister to Mexico to treat on all questions at issue between Mexico and Texas, and, as we have seen, two days after the expedition left he was sending commissioners to the camp of General Arista for the purpose of arranging some means of stamping out brigand border warfare, and in order to keep open the commerce of Texas with the western settlements of Mexico on the Rio Grande.<sup>48</sup> Andrew Jackson, who had continued his interest in Texas, understood the importance of this phase of the question, and on May 25, 1842, wrote to Houston as follows:

The wild goose campaign to Santa Fé was an ill-judged affair; and their surrender without the fire of a gun has lessened the prowess of the Texans in the minds of the Mexicans, and it will take another San Jacinto affair to restore their character.<sup>49</sup>

The expedition failed, and it is easy to criticise a venture that has failed. It is easy to see how certain conditions should have been anticipated and guarded against, but none of Lamar's critics pointed out any of these things before the enterprise was undertaken, the only cause of opposition being the expense. Since it failed, however, there were many who were willing to criticise the plans and the policy, and one critic went so far as to demand that Lamar be sent to Mexico and be sacrificed for the prisoners who were in Mexico at that time.<sup>50</sup> But if it had succeeded, and there were strong evidences that it would succeed, Lamar would have added to Texas a tremendous territory, and would have secured valuable trade for Texas ports. It may be well enough to judge of its expediency from its failure, but to judge rightly the policy, one should take into consideration the plans and purposes

<sup>48</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 748.

<sup>49</sup>Jackson to Houston, May 25, 1842, Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 329, note.

<sup>50</sup>Lamar Papers, No.

of Lamar, and the seeming justification in his own mind at the time for the enterprise.

## CHAPTER V

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS DURING LAMAR'S ADMINISTRATION

When Lamar assumed the presidency the independence of Texas had been recognized only by the United States. This recognition had been extended just before the close of Jackson's administration. The Texan offer of annexation, which had been adopted by an almost unanimous vote in the summer of 1836, had been definitely rejected by the United States in August, 1837, and in October, 1838, the minister of Texas to the United States, acting on instructions from President Houston, withdrew it. This action was commended by Lamar in his inaugural address. Shortly after this address the Congress adopted resolutions endorsing the withdrawal of the offer, though the preceding Congress had refused to take such action.

The withdrawal of the offer of annexation immediately gave Texas a better standing among the nations of the world. As long as England and France believed that Texas was only waiting for annexation to the United States, they were not materially interested in its affairs, but now there seemed to be a favorable opportunity for friendly relations or for exploitation, and the European countries became more interested in the development of Texas. Lamar made deliberate use of the changed attitude, advising Congress to levy only nominal tariff duties in order to draw the trade of the European countries, and instructing the various representatives of Texas in Europe to offer favorable commercial concessions in return for recognition of Texan independence. Partly as a result of this policy, and partly from other causes which I shall show in the proper place the first year of Lamar's administration saw the recognition of Texan independence by France, and during 1840 England, Holland, and Belgium extended recognition.

In the policy of standing aloof from the United States while pursuing friendly relations with England and France, Lamar was following in part the policy suggested by his predecessor though he gave vitality to it because of his well known and strong opposition to annexation. The policy of direct negotiation of peace with Mexico on the basis of the purchase of her territory by Texas

began with Lamar, however, and during his administration he sent three separate agents to Mexico for this purpose, while numerous secret agents kept him informed of the developments. At the same time, while remaining officially neutral, he gave some countenance to the various revolts of the federalists against the centralists in power at that time. I shall follow out with some detail these efforts to negotiate with Mexico, and also discuss the relations between Texas and the United States, France, and England.

### *I. Efforts to Negotiate Peace with Mexico*

Just who was responsible for the idea of sending an agent to Mexico for direct negotiations, it is impossible to say. Lamar had nothing to say with regard to this policy in his inaugural address or in his message to Congress a few days later. In fact, the first time that he took Congress into his confidence was in November, 1838, when he told the Congress in a secret session the result of the first mission, and announced that he had sent another. On September 12, 1838, James Morgan, an old friend of Lamar, sent him a confidential letter from a friend in New York, and asking his opinion of the project set forth.<sup>1</sup> This enclosure has not been found, but a letter of December 27 from Morgan indicates that the friend in New York was James Treat, who afterward became a secret agent of Texas to Mexico, and that his suggestion was that a secret agent be sent from Texas to bring about overtures of peace from Mexico on a basis of the purchase of her own territory by Texas. Morgan advised the adoption of this policy.<sup>2</sup> A short time afterward George L. Hammecken, who was also well acquainted with conditions in Mexico, wrote suggesting a peace commission to Mexico.<sup>3</sup> This was followed by a letter from Samuel Plummer, another man who was acquainted with conditions in Mexico, advising similar action.<sup>4</sup>

There was apparently no connection between these men, but all knew intimately the conditions in Mexico, and all advised the sending of a peace commission. All of them had lived in Mexico for some time or had just been there, and spoke with a full knowledge of conditions. It did not take their statements, however, to in-

<sup>1</sup>*Lamar Papers*, No. 814.

<sup>2</sup>Morgan to Lamar, December 27, 1838, *Lamar Papers*, No. 959.

<sup>3</sup>Hammecken to Lamar, January 2, 1839, *Lamar Papers*, No. 984.

<sup>4</sup>Plummer to Lamar, February 16, 1839, *Lamar Papers*, No. 1068.



dicate to Lamar and his advisers that if there was ever to be a propitious time for a negotiated peace, that was the time.

For the greater part of 1838, and until March, 1839, the Mexican ports were blockaded by a French squadron. For several years there had been complaints on the part of French subjects in Mexico on account of unfair treatment, and the government of France had demanded a settlement of the claims of her citizens against Mexico. Despairing of an amicable settlement, the French minister withdrew from Mexico City on January 16, 1838, leaving the legation in charge of a *chargé d'affaires*. Upon leaving Vera Cruz he was met by a French squadron under Bazoche, who had been instructed to support the demands of the minister with force. On March 21 Bazoche sent an ultimatum to the Mexican government demanding the immediate payment of \$600,000 to be applied to the claims of French citizens. Four days later the Mexican government announced its refusal to accede to the demands, and refused to discuss the matter unless the French squadron retired.<sup>5</sup> On April 16 Bazoche acted upon his threat and announced that diplomatic relations were suspended and the ports blockaded, not against the nation, as he said but against the government. This was probably to weaken the government of Bustamante, which was already growing unpopular.<sup>6</sup> A French squadron stood off Vera Cruz and effectively prevented the entrance or egress of any vessels, thus seriously crippling the finances of the country. This blockade continued throughout the summer with the acquiescence of Great Britain, and to the delight of the Texans.

While the French were blockading the ports of Mexico, the federalists used the opportunity to break out in revolts in various parts of the country. The adoption of the centralized constitution in 1835, which had resulted in the Texas revolution, and which had caused an outbreak in New Mexico in 1837, had never been universally accepted. In the summer of 1838 the discontent made itself felt in uprisings in Sonora, Sinaloa, California, Tamaulipas, and Yucatan. The most serious of these was in Sonora and Sinaloa, headed by Urrea. Urrea seized the custom-house at Guaymas and restored the federalist system. He was defeated at Mazatlan on May 6, 1838, but went to Tampico and stirred up a re-

<sup>5</sup>Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, V, 187, 188; C. M. Bustamante, *Cabinete Mexicana*, I, 112.

<sup>6</sup>Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, V, 189.

volt there in October, 1838. The government of Bustamante was very weak, and no effective steps were taken to put down and punish the rebels. The cutting off of imports left the country without funds, and Congress took no steps to remedy matters.<sup>7</sup>

Late in October Admiral Baudin arrived at Vera Cruz with additional ships and took over command of the French squadron. He was authorized by his government to enter into negotiations for the settlement of the difficulties. He at once got into communication with Cuevas, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, and made the same demands that had been made by Bazoché in March. The failure of Cuevas to give proper guarantees that the demands would be granted or considered led to the sending of an ultimatum by Baudin on November 21, in which he stated that if the demands were not granted by the 27th he would begin hostilities by an attack on the castle San Juan de Ulua. No adequate response was made, and on the day set San Juan de Ulua was bombarded, and although the Mexicans considered it impregnable, it was captured after a few hours bombardment. The French took possession the following day, promising to restore the fortress as soon as all differences were adjusted. The commander of the Mexican forces agreed to reduce the garrison of Vera Cruz to one thousand men, and to receive back and indemnify the expelled Frenchmen. The French on their part agreed to lift the blockade for eight months.

The Mexican cabinet refused to confirm the agreement of the commander of the forces at Vera Cruz and prepared for fighting. This led to a battle at Vera Cruz early in December, when the Mexicans under the command of Santa Anna were severely defeated. Shortly after this the British minister offered his services to mediate the difficulty, and both sides accepted. This resulted in the signing of a treaty on March 9, 1839, by which the Mexicans agreed to everything demanded by the French.<sup>8</sup> San Juan de Ulua was restored on April 7, and the French fleet retired.<sup>9</sup>

These conditions, as I have said, were known to Lamar and influenced him to send a peace commissioner to treat with the Mexican authorities. Besides, Lamar and his cabinet had heard that Santa Anna was again at the head of the government in Mexico,

<sup>7</sup>Rives, *United States and Mexico, 1821-1848*, I, 435.

<sup>8</sup>Dublan and Lozano, *Legislacion Mexicana*, III, 617.

<sup>9</sup>Baneroft, *History of Mexico*, V, 204.

probably because he was appointed to the command of the army at Vera Cruz, and they considered that as favorable to Texas. It will be recalled that Santa Anna, while a prisoner in Texas after the battle of San Jacinto, entered into a secret treaty with the Texan authorities by which he agreed not to take up arms against Texas during the war for independence; that he would prepare the cabinet in Mexico for the favorable reception of a minister when Texas saw fit to send one; and that a treaty of amity, commerce, and limits should be agreed to, the limits of Texas not to extend beyond the Rio Grande.<sup>10</sup> It is apparent that this belief also influenced Lamar to send the mission.

The information that several towns in the north had declared for the federalist system was contained in a letter dated December 17, 1838, from Canales, a federalist leader, who prophesied that within a short time the whole republic would come over to the Federalist party.

The information that Santa Anna was at the head of the government as a supporter of the Federalist party was contained in the letter of Plummer, referred to above. It was this letter that determined Lamar to send immediately an envoy to Mexico, and he considered it of enough importance to send his secretary of state Barnard E. Bee. Bee had been intended for appointment as minister to the United States, and had been instructed to get in touch with the minister from Mexico and attempt to form a treaty of peace through him; at the same time he was to seek the mediation of the United States. When it was decided to send Bee to Mexico, Richard G. Dunlap was sent as minister to the United States with the same instructions as were given to Bee. Both were to do everything in their power to come to an agreement with Mexico.<sup>11</sup>

Bee was given two commissions, one as minister plenipotentiary to be used in case he was received by the Mexican government, and one as agent in case he was not received. He was given full powers to negotiate for peace, and sign a treaty securing it, but he was to require the unconditional recognition of the independence of Texas, and was to admit no limits less than those prescribed by the act of Congress of December 19, 1836, which provided that

<sup>10</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 434; *Niles Register*, LXIX, 98.

<sup>11</sup>Webb to Dunlap, March 13 and 14, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, I, 368-378.

the Rio Grande to its source was the boundary between Texas and Mexico. If Mexico was willing to establish peace and recognize the original boundaries of Texas—which included only to the Nueces—he was empowered to propose a compromise by offering to purchase all included between the original boundary and the Rio Grande at a sum not exceeding five million dollars.<sup>12</sup>

The commission and instructions to Bee were dated February 20, 1839, but for some reason he did not get away from Texas until April 1. He then went to Mobile, where he hoped to secure passage to Vera Cruz. Failing there he proceeded to New Orleans, where he got into communication with James Hamilton, Loan Commissioner of the Republic of Texas, and with a Mr. Gordon of the house of Lizardi and Company, the chief holders of Mexican bonds. It was probably here that the idea was conceived to use the indemnity which Texas offered Mexico for recognition to redeem the Mexican bonds held by English investors. Bee remained in New Orleans until May 2, when he embarked for Vera Cruz, arriving there on May 8.

This was the most inauspicious time that could have been chosen to arrive in Mexico with such an object. The difficulties with France, which had been counted upon to expedite negotiations, had been settled and the French fleet had sailed away a month before. Besides, with the withdrawal of the French the authorities had been able to give some attention to the Federalist risings, and one of the most formidable—that of Tampico—had been put down by Santa Anna and Urrea had been captured. Santa Anna was temporarily in charge of the executive office while Bustamante was absent in the north on a campaign against the Federalists there, and certainly nothing could be hoped for from him. So, while Bee set forth on his mission with high hopes, he arrived when an entirely new situation had developed, and there was no chance of success.

While remaining on board the schooner Woodbury at Vera Cruz he communicated with various officials requesting that he be allowed to go to Mexico City to lay his case before the Council. This was peremptorily refused, if he had come to treat for independence. He was informed by General Victoria, the commandant at Vera Cruz, who had acted as the agent of the government in

<sup>12</sup>Webb to Bee, February 20, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 434.

communicating with Bee, that the French question was settled, the Federalists put down, that reform was about to take place, and that with the great resources at her command Mexico would be forced to wage an efficient war on Texas in order to bring her back into the fold—all this in urging that Texas come back to her allegiance to Mexico. Failing to interest the Mexican authorities in his mission, and receiving threatening letters from several of the people of Vera Cruz, Bee took refuge on the French frigate *Phaeton* on May 28, and wrote letters to several members of the cabinet suggesting that negotiations for peace and recognition be held in Washington.<sup>13</sup>

While Bee was still waiting at Vera Cruz to hear from Mexico City as to the possibility of his reception, Pakenham, British minister in Mexico, received a letter from Gordon in New Orleans, written April 29, 1839, stating the purposes of Bee's mission, and advising that Pakenham give assistance to his project. He stated that Bee was prepared to offer five million dollars for the land between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and suggested that Mexico should satisfy the claims of English bondholders by locating lands for them within the disputed territory, accepting the five million dollars from Texas, and then agreeing to the line claimed by Texas.<sup>14</sup> Pakenham reported this plan to the Mexican authorities, but was informed that Bee had been rejected without hearing what he had to propose.

Pakenham had been absent on leave in England in 1838, and in October, just before leaving for his return to Mexico, he had been instructed by Palmerston to urge upon Mexico the importance of a prompt recognition of Texas. He now used the opportunity presented by Gordon's suggestion and insisted upon the acceptance of that policy. He laid stress upon the advantage to Mexico of having a barrier state between her and the United States. Gorostiza, the foreign minister, replied that he realized the value of such an arrangement, but that the Mexican government dared not risk so unpopular an act, and hinted that as a preliminary to recognition Mexico would welcome from England a suggestion of an armistice. With regard to the boundary desired by Texas, Gorostiza said that Mexico would never consent to the claims of Texas.

<sup>13</sup>*Lamar Papers*, No. 1255.

<sup>14</sup>Gordon to Pakenham, April 29, 1839; Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas*, 26.

"Reconquest is admitted to be impossible," said Pakenham in reporting the conversation to Palmerston, "and yet a feeling of mistaken pride, foolishly called regard for the national honor, deters the government from putting an end to a state of things highly prejudicial to the interests of Texas and attended with no sort of advantage to this country."<sup>15</sup>

Bee had left for his mission not over-sanguine as to its success, believing that Washington was the proper place to treat. After his failure to get in touch with the authorities in Mexico, he was naturally still convinced that he should have gone to Washington. He wrote just before leaving for Vera Cruz: "We made a merry move in coming so suddenly upon these people, the first plan was the true one. It ought to have opened at Washington."<sup>16</sup> He continued firm in the belief that with less publicity Mexico would be willing to come to terms. He was further convinced of this when, after his arrival in New Orleans, he received a letter from Almonte, Mexican secretary of war, stating that the President was willing for him to open his views to the government. At this point James Treat enters into the negotiations.<sup>17</sup>

James Treat had lived in Mexico for a number of years, was well acquainted with Santa Anna, and for some time had been in correspondence with the secret agent of the Mexican government in New Orleans. It was he who had outlined a scheme for pacification in December, 1838, and who had been recommended by James Morgan for a peace mission to Mexico. In the summer of 1839 he became acquainted with James Hamilton,<sup>18</sup> and on June 22

<sup>15</sup>Pakenham to Palmerston, June 3, 1839, British Foreign Office, Mexico, 125; Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas*, 27.

<sup>16</sup>Bee to Webb, May 28, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 449.

<sup>17</sup>Bee to Webb, July 6, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 456.

<sup>18</sup>James Hamilton played such an important part in the history of Texas during this period that some notice of his activities is required. He was a native of South Carolina who had early become interested in Texas. He was a member of Congress from South Carolina from 1822 to 1829, and governor of the state from 1829 to 1830, retiring when Hayne became governor. His first correspondence with Lamar was in June, 1836, when he wrote a letter of introduction for Barnard E. Bee, who was just then coming to Texas. From that time on he was a steady correspondent, and after Lamar was elected president in 1838 he wrote frequent and long letters giving his advice as to public policy, and probably more than anyone else he influenced Lamar's actions. Just before the close of Houston's administration an effort had been made to secure the appointment of Hamilton as loan commissioner. Upon the refusal of Houston to appoint him, Bee had resigned from the cabinet, probably

Hamilton wrote to Lamar advising that Treat be appointed to assist Bee in the negotiations in New Orleans. Without waiting for a reply, he took the liberty of sending Treat to New Orleans with instructions to assist Bee by getting into communication with the Mexican secret agent.<sup>19</sup> Before anything was done, however, Hamilton, acting on the advice of Poinsett, American secretary of war, advised that Treat be sent direct to Mexico City. This advice was acquiesced in by Bee, and Lamar decided to act upon the advice and send Treat as secret agent with full powers to negotiate a treaty.<sup>20</sup>

The instructions to Treat were in part a duplicate of those to Bee. The unconditional acknowledgment of the independence of Texas within the statutory boundaries was to be demanded as a *sine qua non*. The Texas authorities were now willing to go further in territorial claims, however, and Treat was instructed to propose as the boundary, a line commencing at the mouth of the Rio Grande and running midway of its channel to El Paso, and from that point due west to the Gulf of California, and along the southern shore of that gulf to the Pacific Ocean. "This boundary will not be strenuously insisted upon," said the instructions, "but may be intimated as a counterpoise to any extravagant expectations on the part of Mexico and as a premonition to that government of the ultimate destination of that remote territory." He was authorized to offer up to five million dollars for a recognition of the first claimed boundary, any part of which might be in Mexican bonds.<sup>21</sup>

Treat left Austin immediately upon receiving his instructions and proceeded to New Orleans, where he arrived on August 13. He left there two days later for New York, arriving on the 29th. Here he was detained for two months while waiting for transportation and attempting to secure funds for the trip. He finally left New York in the latter part of October, and arrived, after a

determining Lamar to appoint Bee as secretary of State. He visited Texas in March, 1839, and was appointed by Lamar as loan commissioner. and was sent to France and England to assist Henderson in securing recognition while negotiating for a loan. He was sent on various diplomatic missions after this, which will appear when I discuss the relations of Texas with Europe.

<sup>19</sup>Hamilton to Lamar, June 28, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 453.

<sup>20</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 459, 466, 470.

<sup>21</sup>Burnet to Treat, August 9, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 470.

long journey, at Vera Cruz on November 28. He reached Mexico City on December 11 and began his negotiations.

The internal conditions in Mexico throughout the greater part of 1839 were unsettled. The Federalist movement, which had gained considerable strength in 1838, was still flourishing in Tampico and various parts of the north. With the French difficulties settled, the government decided to proceed with vigor against the insurgents under Urrea at Tampico, and Santa Anna, whose loss of a leg in the battle of Vera Cruz had restored him to favor with the populace, urged the president, Bustamante, to lead the expedition against them. Bustamante reluctantly agreed. The executive authority would normally have fallen upon the vice-president, Nicolás Bravo, but the populace demanded Santa Anna, and Bravo gracefully stepped aside, and the Council appointed Santa Anna. Santa Anna assumed the executive power on March 18, 1839, and Bustamante set out for Tampico.<sup>22</sup>

Bustamante traveled leisurely towards Tampico and allowed the insurgents to get between him and Mexico City. Santa Anna, who was in the capital, raised a force and advanced to meet them, and defeated them at Acajete on May 3, 1839. In June Tampico was taken. In July Bustamante returned to the capital and assumed the executive authority. As he had seen no fighting he was discredited and his government was weaker than ever. Santa Anna was the popular hero, but he did not consider that conditions were ripe for his return to power, so he retired to his ranch and left the control of affairs to Bustamante.<sup>23</sup> A complete reorganization of the cabinet took place, however. Juan de Dios Cañedo succeeded Gorostiza as foreign minister, Luis Gonzales Cuevas became secretary of the interior, Xavier de Echeverria, secretary of the treasury, and J. N. Almonte, secretary of war.<sup>24</sup>

Before proceeding with Treat's negotiations it will be necessary to notice the efforts of the Texan minister in Washington to negotiate with the Mexican minister, and also his efforts to secure the mediation of the United States. It will be remembered that Dunlap had been instructed to treat if possible with the Mexican min-

<sup>22</sup>Bustamante, *Cabinete Mexicana*, I, 176; Rives, *United States and Mexico*, I, 450.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 451.

<sup>24</sup>Treat to Burnet, (Enclosure) September 21, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 488.



ister in Washington, and if necessary he was to secure the mediation of the United States. To Dunlap's suggestion that the United States mediate between Texas and Mexico, Forsyth gave a half-hearted assent, and instructed Ellis, the new minister to Mexico, to be ready, while observing strict neutrality, to interpose his good offices between Mexico and Texas, but not until Mexico should ask for them.<sup>25</sup> The Mexican minister, Martinez, was made aware of the purposes of Dunlap, but it was not until October that the two ministers got together. During the second week of October they held several conferences, and Dunlap submitted to Martinez a formal request that negotiations be undertaken. The Mexican minister responded that he had no authority to enter into a treaty, but that he would send Dunlap's suggestions to his home government. This was the end of efforts to negotiate a treaty in this manner.<sup>26</sup>

Great Britain had, on her own initiative, taken some steps towards mediation before Treat's arrival in Mexico. As I have already stated, Palmerston had given verbal instructions to Pakenham in October, 1838, urging the recognition of Texan independence, which instructions were submitted after Bee's failure. On April 25, 1839, Palmerston sent his first written instructions to Pakenham on the subject of Texas. In this letter Palmerston argued at length as to the impossibility of a reconquest of Texas. In supplementary instructions enclosed in this letter, Palmerston said that it was not likely that Mexico would listen at once to the suggestion for recognition, but he did hope that she would be willing to accept the good offices of Great Britain.<sup>27</sup> Cañedo had become foreign minister when these instructions were received, and to him Pakenham communicated the substance of them. Cañedo responded that he realized the importance of the recognition of Texan independence, but that the government could not risk so unpopular an act. He stated that Mexico might welcome from Great Britain a suggestion for suspension of hostilities; and Paken-

<sup>25</sup>Forsyth to Ellis, May 3, 1839, MS., Archives. See also Reeves, *American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk*, 87; Dunlap to Lamar, May 16, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, I, 383.

<sup>26</sup>Dunlap to Burnet, October 12, 1839, (Enclosing Martinez to Dunlap, October 8, 1839) *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, I, 421-424.

<sup>27</sup>Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas*, 28-29.

ham was convinced in September that such an arrangement could be made preparatory to pacification.<sup>23</sup>

From that time forward Pakenham was active in the interest of the recognition of Texas independence by Mexico. On December 12, 1839, he addressed a letter to James Hamilton, who was about to set out on a diplomatic mission to Great Britain, in which he gave an account of his activities. After acknowledging a letter from Hamilton written November 18, he said:

It is some time since I received from Viscount Palmerston Instructions to tender the good offices of Her Majesty's Government towards effecting an arrangement between this Country and Texas; but I regret to say that all my exertions to induce this Government to entertain the question of recognition have hitherto proved unavailing. Not but that the more enlightened Members of the present Administration appear to understand that to continue the contest with Texas would be worse than useless, but there is no man among them bold enough to confront the popular opinion, or, I should rather say the popular prejudice upon this point, which is strongly pronounced against any accommodation with Texas. Besides which they fear, and not without reason,, that, for the sake of Party objects, an attempt would dishonestly be made to crush by the unpopularity which would, very certainly, attend such a measure, any Government which should be bold enough to advocate the policy of alienating what is still talked of as a part of the National Territory.

Under these circumstances it appeared to me that the next best thing to propose was a mutual suspension of hostilities as a preparatory step to the ulterior measure of absolute recognition at a future period. . . .

Some time ago Senor Cañedo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, to speak the truth, strongly inclines to the course which wisdom and sound policy recommend with regard to the question of Texas, informed me that after repeated and arduous discussions with his Colleagues he had succeeded in obtaining their consent to place on the records of their deliberations a minute to the effect that if Commissioners from Texas should present themselves, they would be listened to, with the distinct understanding, however, that no proposition for the alienation of the right of Sovereignty would be entertained. But as he would not take upon himself to put into my hands any written communication to that effect, or even convey to me a more definite understanding of what his Government might be disposed to accede to in the way of armistice, or otherwise, I did not think myself at liberty to recommend to Colonel Bee, with whom, on the occasion of his late Mission, I

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 32-33.

had had some communication, to undertake a fresh journey to this country upon such vague and uncertain grounds.

On receipt of your letter<sup>29</sup> I again entered into communication with the Mexican Government upon the important subject to which it relates, but I am sorry to say, as far as regards the question of recognition, with no better success than before. Nevertheless I have obtained from Senor Cañedo a written communication, . . . stating that this Government are disposed to listen to proposals from the Inhabitants of Texas; but that on no account will they relinquish the right of Sovereignty over that Territory.<sup>30</sup>

Both the Bee mission and the Treat mission were undertaken by President Lamar without consulting Congress. On December 10, 1839, however, he sent a special message to a secret session of Congress giving a full account of the proceedings so far, including the reasons for sending Bee, the causes of his failure, and the reasons for his sending a secret agent. He also mentioned the terms on which the agents were instructed to make peace.<sup>31</sup> As a result of this, Congress passed a joint resolution endorsing his acts, as follows:

1. Congress views with entire approbation the present policy of the Executive.

2. [Boundary as in the Act of December 19, 1836.]

3. That should such a Treaty be passed between the Commissioner on the part of the Government of Texas and Mexico, and

<sup>29</sup>Written November 18 and received December 4, 1839. Hamilton had proposed that Mexico acknowledge the independence of Texas and receive from Texas the sum of five million dollars, with the understanding that the money go directly into the pockets of the bondholders. The bondholders were then to release the lands that had already been granted to them by the government of Mexico. He also informed Pakenham that Treat was on his way to Mexico, but suggested that peace negotiations be begun in London, so that the Mexican bondholders could be present and look after their interests.—Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas*, 37.

<sup>30</sup>Pakenham to Hamilton, December 12, 1839, (Copy enclosed in Hamilton to Burnet, January 5, 1840) *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, III, 879-880.

Pakenham enclosed a copy of the written communication by Cañedo, the important part of which was as follows: "V. E. se sirve manifestarme su deseo de saber si por se ha tomado por este Gobierno alguna resolucion en virtud de las propuestas amistosas que en cumplimiento de sus citadas instrucciones ha hecho; y en contestacion tengo la honra de decirle que los Commissionados de los habitantes de Texas seran oydos por el Gobierno Mexicano, bajo la condicion indispensable de que este no ha de desistir de la Soberania nacional sobre aquel Departamento de la Republica."—*Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 505.

<sup>31</sup>Winkler, editor, *Secret Journals of the Senate of the Republic of Texas*, 148.

after the same may have been ratified and confirmed by the President and Senate of this Republic, our Commissioners of loans in Europe are authorized to borrow the amount which may be stipulated in said Treaty, at an interest not exceeding six per cent.

4. Be it further resolved, That the said Commissioners appointed on the part of Texas shall if practicable procure the Guaranty of Great Britain for the faithful performance of the Treaty by both parties.<sup>32</sup>

One of the first things that Treat had to report after arriving in Mexico was the promulgation of a proclamation by the President announcing the renewal of hostilities with Texas, and the consideration by Congress of ways and means for financing a military campaign.<sup>33</sup> In fact, A. S. Wright, a secret correspondent of the Texan government was convinced that Mexico was making preparations to invade Texas and kept the Texan authorities informed for some months before Treat arrived.<sup>34</sup> Public or political sentiment would probably have demanded some effort to subdue Texas at any rate; but the news that Texans had joined with the insurgent Federalists on the Rio Grande led to the proclamation of a renewal of the war, and special efforts to secure action by Congress in support of the campaign.<sup>35</sup>

The Texan authorities had shown a marked partiality for the Federalists, partly because they were fighting for the same principles for which the Texans had fought in 1835 and 1836, but chiefly because they felt that the Federalists would regard with more favor the claims of Texas to independence. On December 17, 1838, the Licentiate Antonio Canales, commander of the Third Division of the Federal army, wrote a letter to Lamar announcing the capture of several towns by the Federalists.<sup>36</sup> In this letter he addressed Lamar as "President of the Republic of Texas," which was thereafter cited as an indication that the Federalists recognized the claims of Texas in advance of their success in the revolution. As a result of the friendly feeling engendered by this letter, Congress passed a joint resolution providing for the open-

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 166.

<sup>33</sup>Treat to Burnet, November 29, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 501.

<sup>34</sup>Wright to Bee, August 29 to November 18, 1839, in *Ibid.*, 615-632.

<sup>35</sup>Wright to Bryan, November 21, 1839, in *Ibid.*, II, 496.

<sup>36</sup>Canales to Lamar, December 17, 1838, in *Ibid.*, II, 430.

ing of trade with the Rio Grande settlements, and the President issued his proclamation to that effect in February, 1839.<sup>37</sup>

In the spring of 1839 General Anaya, later put to death after the capture of Tampico in June, 1839, who was looked upon as the chief of the Federalist party, visited Texas and promised the Texan authorities that if they would allow him to transport troops across Texas and raise troops in Texas, he would, in case of success, recognize their independence. This permission was refused. Later the Federalists of the northern states sent Francisco Vidaurri, governor of Coahuila, to make overtures for an alliance between Texas and the states of Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Chihuahua, New Mexico, Durango, and the Californias.<sup>38</sup> In spite of the strong sentiment in favor of such an alliance, the authorities refused to entertain the idea.

After the overthrow of the insurgents in Tampico in June, General Canales, Colonels José Maria Gonzales, and Antonio Zapata with a small force fled to Lipantitlan on the Nueces river. Here Canales issued a proclamation inviting the Texans to join him, promising them an equal division of the spoils, twenty-five dollars per month, and a half league of land to those who should serve during the war.<sup>39</sup> Though the government had refused to join Canales, about one hundred and eighty Texans under Colonels Reuben Ross and S. W. Jordan joined the Federalists. On September 30, 1839, the Federalist forces, consisting now of six hundred men, crossed the Rio Grande and marched against Guerrero, which was held by General Pavon with five hundred regulars and four pieces of artillery. Pavon retreated toward Mier and was followed by Canales. On October 3 was fought the battle of Alcantro, in which the Texans distinguished themselves by overwhelmingly defeating the enemy. This was the battle which caused the preparations for an active campaign against Texas.<sup>40</sup>

The Texans continued their operations in connection with Canales and the Federalists, participating in January, 1840, in the creation of the "Republic of the Rio Grande." It is not my purpose, however, to follow their activities. The President had, while

<sup>37</sup>*Lamar Papers*, No. 1079.

<sup>38</sup>Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 327.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid*; Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 274.

<sup>40</sup>Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 328; Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 274.

treating their envoys with courtesy, refused to join the Federalists in their campaign against the central government. It is likely that he desired their success, as it would have made things better for Texas; but he did not trust the Mexicans. On December 21, 1839, he issued a proclamation warning the citizens of Texas not to invade Mexico, and not to take part in any marauding expedition or other acts of hostility against Mexico, until a renewal of hostilities should be announced by public notice. He declared that any citizen who should invade Mexico, or by any hostile act molest its inhabitants within their own territory, should be considered without the protection of the Texan government, which disclaimed all participation in their conduct, and could afford no countenance to their unauthorized acts.<sup>41</sup>

In his letter of November 29 from Vera Cruz Treat told of the impression created in Mexico by the Texan participation in the battle of Alcantro, but he dismissed the matter by saying the impression would blow over. Later in a letter to James Hamilton, a copy of which was sent to the Texas state department, he considered it more serious than he had at first thought. With regard to this matter and the action of the Mexican government upon it, he wrote:

. . . You will have seen that the movement of Ross and his party, with other volunteers, to which they attribute the success of the Federalists, and the surrender of the troops in or near Mier, (some 600 men) have produced much excitement on the part of the Govmt as well as in the public mind. The Govmt. having taken all the measures in their power, have called on Congress for special powers to levy taxes to support the war against Texas, and to reunite that department to the national union, etc. etc. etc. Not satisfied with this measure initiated in Congress, and without waiting for the action of that body, another project of Law is sent down by the Secretary of War (Sr. Almonte) declaring it treason against the state for any one "to write act or speak in favour of the views and intentions of the Texans; or in favour of the views of any foreign power having for its object to dismember the territory of Mexico etc."<sup>42</sup>

These two proposals were sent to a special committee by the

<sup>41</sup>*Austin City Gazette*, January 1, 1840.

<sup>42</sup>Treat to Hamilton, December 16, 1839, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 508-509. Treat had a peculiar habit of underscoring, entirely without meaning, many words in his despatches. I shall ignore his italics, using them only when it seems that emphasis is intended.

Chamber of Deputies. The committee reported against granting special powers, but recommended proceeding with the expedition under the ordinary powers of the government. Instead of reporting ways and means promptly, they recommended measures assessing taxes which could not be collected for three or four months.<sup>43</sup> The Deputies refused to accept the report of the committee, and sent it back to them for revision.<sup>44</sup> On January 1, 1840, the President, in his annual message to Congress, expressed surprise at the recognition of Texan independence by France, and urged upon the Congress the necessity of passing the laws asked for the prosecution of the war. After praising the soldiers who were operating against the Federalists in the north, he said:

The Executive will not fail to use every effort in their power to secure our frontier by the recovery of the territory of Texas, usurped by the ungrateful foreigners, to whom we gave a generous hospitality in that part of the Republic.

On the 18th June of last year, the Government presented to their Council the Bill which, with some modifications, they afterwards laid before the Chambers on the 26th November, demanding powers for making the necessary expenditure, and for carrying into effect the political and military measures requisite for reuniting the Department of Texas to the National Union, which Bill is now before the Chamber of Deputies, as well as another, having for its object to declare traitors to their country such persons who, by act or writing favour the views of any foreign Power, or of the usurpers of Texas, for the purpose of dismembering or making themselves masters of the Mexican territory. The Executive Government have the honor to recommend both these bills once more to your notice, hoping that you will take them into consideration, with the diligence and promptitude which the importance of their object requires of your patriotism.<sup>45</sup>

Apparently this was an unfavorable situation for negotiation, and for the next month Treat did not reveal himself or the objects of his mission to the authorities. Still he did not believe that any serious efforts would be made to subjugate Texas. He thought that by asking for political and military powers, they desired to secure authority to raise an army and at the same time negotiate with the Texans. During the next month, however, he was busily engaged in working secretly against the granting of the extraor-

<sup>43</sup>Treat to Lamar, December 20, 1839, in *Ibid.*, II, 513.

<sup>44</sup>Treat to Lamar, December 31, 1839, in *Ibid.*, II, 523.

<sup>45</sup>*British and Foreign State Papers*, XXIX, 1084 (Translation).

dinary powers. It was not until February 1, 1840, that he, through the intervention of Pakenham, had an interview with Cañedo, minister for foreign affairs.

Naturally, this first interview was introductory and nothing was accomplished. Cañedo explained to Treat the difficulty he had had in persuading the President and other members of the cabinet to receive him at all, explaining that the intervention of Pakenham had been the determining factor. He had been finally authorized by the President to listen to all that Treat might have to say, without committing himself in return. When Cañedo asked to see Treat's credentials it developed that he had no formal credentials, but only the letter of instructions signed by Burnet. Cañedo was willing to accept the letter as sufficient, but stated that the other members of the Government would not, and that it was necessary to secure proper credentials before proceeding. In the meantime, he was willing to accept the guarantee of Pakenham that Treat was officially accredited. The proper credentials were dispatched on March 12.<sup>46</sup>

On March 1, 1840, Treat got so far as submitting to Cañedo the formal *projet* of a treaty, in accordance with his instructions.<sup>47</sup> On April 15 he received his credentials. On the 18th he communicated this fact to Cañedo, and was informed that Cañedo was in sympathy with his desires. Cañedo also informed him as to the procedure he would advocate. The plan as outlined to Treat was as follows: A special cabinet meeting was to be held, when an effort would be made to pass the question along to the Council of the Government. If the Council recommended any action, the cabinet was to pass the matter along to the legislature for their action, where it was hoped that authorization would be given to treat with Texas.<sup>48</sup>

This procedure was followed exactly. On May 5 the cabinet ordered that all the papers, documents, and correspondence be submitted to the "Council of Government" for their opinion, with the question: Whether the Council concurred with the cabinet in their resolution to ask Congress for special powers to negotiate an amicable arrangement with the Government of Texas.<sup>49</sup> The mat-

<sup>46</sup>Treat to Lamar, February 1, 1840, Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 540.

<sup>47</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 592.

<sup>48</sup>Treat to Lamar, April 21, 1840. Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 606.

<sup>49</sup>Treat to Lamar, May 7, 1840. Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 634.



ter went to the Council, which on May 12 voted down by a vote of five to four the unanimous recommendation of a committee of the Council that the views of the cabinet be adopted. This was due to the influence of Gorostiza, Treat thought, who was a friend of Santa Anna and an opponent of the existing government. He announced his purpose of attempting to secure the submission of the whole question to Congress without recommendation. "I think that my efforts," he wrote,

and those of some friends will prove Successful, as I am assured that whatever may be the range and tenor of the report, it will be such as will Square with the Resolution that will be proposed, viz: To transmit the whole Subject, without expressing an opinion themselves, to the consideration of Congress. With this, and some other timely measures, I think I can expect the result promised.<sup>50</sup>

The papers were submitted to Congress on July 3 for discussion, but on the night of the 14th one of the periodical revolutions in the Capital broke out and prevented their consideration.<sup>51</sup>

Lamar was becoming impatient at the delay in accomplishing any definite results. The threatening proclamations of the Centralist commander in Coahuila, General Arista, and the manifest efforts of the Mexicans to stir up the Indians made it difficult for the Government to restrain public sentiment which demanded a coalition with the Federalists. On March 27 Treat had notified the Texan Government that he had formally laid before the Mexican Government a proposal for peace. In response to that letter, May 7, 1840, the Texas secretary of state, Abner S. Lipscomb, wrote as follows:

The President has directed me to instruct you, that if after the reception of your credentials, you can obtain no decisively favorable answer to your overtures for peace, that you will withdraw from your Agency. Should this be the result, you are instructed to make known to the Minister of Her Britanic Majesty in Mexico, that should this Government be constrained to change its position and commence offensive operations, it will not be with a view of extending our territory, beyond the *Rio Grande* and any occupation or military movement west of that River, will be temporary and solely with the view of forcing the enemy to make peace.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.* to *Ibid.*, May 28, 1840, *Ibid.*, II, 636.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 669; 670.

<sup>52</sup>Lipscomb to Treat, May 7, 1840. Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 635.

In June Lamar determined to send the Texas navy on a cruise in the Gulf. This was due to the threat of a blockade of the ports of Texas by the Mexicans, who were supposed to have secured a navy in England, to the desire of Lamar to establish communications with the Federalists of Yucatan and Tabasco, who had seemingly made good their secession from Mexico, and to communicate with Treat, who was expected to have completed his mission by that time. The commander of the navy, E. W. Moore, was instructed to proceed to some safe anchorage off Vera Cruz and send in the dispatches for Pakenham. He was to cause one of his vessels to stand off Point Maria-Andrea for thirteen days to receive any communication that might be sent by Treat. If he should receive notice that Treat had failed in his mission, he was instructed to cruise against the Mexican vessels and make prizes of them. He was not to commence hostilities until Treat had notified him of the failure of negotiations, but if attacked, he was to defend himself. Finally, he was to endeavor to ascertain the condition of the state of Yucatan, and the disposition of the functionaries administering the Government, "whether friendly or otherwise to us, any manifestation of friendship from them you will reciprocate."<sup>53</sup>

With Moore went a letter to Treat from the secretary of state in which he again called attention to the conduct of the Mexicans on the frontier and denounced the conspiracies of the Mexicans with the Indians. Lipscomb instructed Treat to inform the Texan Government as to the length of time necessary to come to some conclusion. He was also to inform the Mexican Government that Texas had about reached a decision to begin hostilities if no treaty were possible. "It would perhaps," he wrote,

be well for you to urge upon Mexico the moderation of this Government in not co-operating (thus far) with the Federalists on the Rio Grande as she has been strongly urged to do, and might have done with great benefit to herself and detriment to Mexico, that it is a forbearance we cannot practice much longer, lest we lose all the advantages which such a co-operation would give us, without gaining any thing from the Central Government of Mexico. The Federalists are still sanguine of Success, and unremitting in their overtures to us, to make a Common Cause in making war on

<sup>53</sup>Lamar to Moore, June 20. 1840. Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 651-652.

the Centralists, and in return, would grant every thing we could reasonably ask of them.<sup>54</sup>

This letter did not reach Treat until August 13. He had already, after the revolution in the Capital in July, communicated to the foreign minister Lamar's instructions of May 7, stating that he was under the necessity of hastening negotiations, and receiving a promise of immediate consideration from Cañedo. On August 21 he communicated a long memorandum in which he called attention to the various complaints against Mexico, and urged an immediate consideration of his mission. This receiving no consideration, on September 5 he addressed another letter to the secretary of foreign affairs, stating that if some official or formal assurance of the final determination of the Government with regard to his mission by the 18th, "which may satisfy him of the actual intentions of the Government to enter forthwith upon an amicable Negotiation" were not received, he would be compelled to ask for his passports and withdraw from his mission.<sup>55</sup>

Receiving no response of any kind to this memorandum, Treat on September 21 addressed a note to Cañedo requesting his passports. While waiting for his passports, Pakenham suggested to Cañedo that the only way to avoid a conflict with Texas was to arrange an armistice. Cañedo agreed that if Treat had authority to agree to an armistice, his Government would receive his proposals and act promptly upon them, or, at least, so Pakenham understood. Treat agreed to receive any proposals the Mexican Government might offer. He did, however, draw up a draft of an armistice which he authorized Pakenham to put before the Mexican Government. The plan called for a cessation of hostilities for three or four years, and six months notice were to be given before renewing hostilities. The virtual recognition of the Rio Grande as a boundary was contained in an article requiring any Mexican forces to the east of the river to pass to the other side.<sup>56</sup> On September 29 Cañedo sent Treat's passports by Pakenham without mentioning the matter of the armistice, and Cañedo quit office the following day. Almonte, the strong man of the cabinet, assured Pakenham that he favored an armistice and would

<sup>54</sup>Lipscomb to Treat, June 13, 1840. Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 645.

<sup>55</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 675; 688; 700.

<sup>56</sup>Treat to Lipscomb, September 29, 1840. Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, II, 705, 707, 708.

use his influence to bring it about, so Treat determined to wait eight days longer before leaving the country.

On October 15, 1840, Pakenham informed Treat that the Mexican Government refused to entertain any proposal for an armistice which should not be presented with the previous sanction of the Texan authorities; and that in no case could they consent to a provisional line of demarcation to the south of the San Antonio river. Pakenham stated that he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that nothing could be gained by further overtures to the Government.<sup>57</sup> On account of ill health Treat was forced to remain in Mexico until some time in November, when he embarked on one of the Texan vessels for Galveston. He had been in bad health at various times during his stay in Mexico, and was handicapped in his negotiations on that account. He died on his way to Texas on board ship, November 30, 1840, so we do not have the benefit of his official report summing up the results of his mission, or giving suggestions for the future conduct of Texas. His reports to the Texas authorities were full, however, and make plain the chief Mexican traits of double dealing and procrastination. The following letter from Pakenham to Treat on the eve of his departure for Texas gives a summary from an impartial witness of the main facts connected with Treat's mission:

The Passport issued in conformity with your request accompanied Senor Cañedo's note; but you will perceive that he declines to enter into the explanation solicited by you respecting the transactions connected with your Mission, the fruitless issue of which he attributes to your not having confined your propositions to the basis originally put forth by this Government viz: "That Mexico would not consent to relinquish the sovereignty of the Territory of Texas."

It is true that in Senor Cañedo's letter of the 11th. Decr. 1839, a copy of which I transmitted at the time to Gen. Hamilton, and of the contents of which you are also informed, the non-alienation of sovereignty was stated to be an indispensable condition to any arrangement; but it is no less true that the introductory propositions, presented by you on the 23rd. March last, went directly to solicit the recognition of the independence of Texas, with such boundaries as might hereafter be agreed upon—that this proposition, so far from having been at once rejected by the Mexican Government as inadmissible, was referred to the Council of State, where the whole question with regard to Texas was made the sub-

<sup>57</sup>Garrison, *Dip. Cor. Tex.*, 726.

ject of more than one anxious discussion—and finally that in conformity with the resolution of the Council the correspondence which had passed between Senor Cañedo and myself, relative to your Mission and the proposition presented by you, were submitted to the consideration of the Congress, where, however, the matter appears to have remained altogether unnoticed.

It is therefore certain that the propositions submitted by you, although not confined to the basis originally announced by Señor Cañedo, were to all intents and purposes entertained by the Executive branch of the Government, and not, as Señor Cañedo would wish to have it inferred, rejected *in limine* because they went beyond the basis at first propounded by the Mexican Government.<sup>58</sup>

The news of the failure of Treat's mission came early in December, and President Lamar recommended to Congress the provision for a force sufficient to compel Mexico to acknowledge the independence of Texas. In the House a resolution was passed instructing the committee on military affairs to inquire into the expediency of authorizing the President to raise and equip five thousand men to invade Mexico and compel her to recognize independence. The men were to equip themselves and to have the spoils which they might take, and each was to be entitled to a league and labor of land, and further pay in land which might be taken on the west side of the Rio Grande.<sup>59</sup> On December 5 the Senate sent word that they had appointed a committee to act with the House committee to consider the expediency of a war with Mexico.

At this juncture President Lamar became seriously ill, and on December 12 he petitioned Congress for and received leave of absence to go to New Orleans for treatment. David G. Burnet, the Vice-President, became Acting-President, and continued to urge preparations for an offensive against Mexico. On December 19 he sent to Congress the information that Treat had died on his way to Texas, and that the mission had failed. In spite of the efforts of Burnet to secure the co-operation of Congress, nothing was done save to authorize the employing of three companies of spies.<sup>60</sup> On January 12, 1841, a select committee of the House brought in a report pointing out the poverty of the Republic, and advising against offensive war against Mexico. At the same time,

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 724.

<sup>59</sup>5 Tex. Cong., 1 Sess., *House Journal*, 181-182.

<sup>60</sup>5 Tex. Cong., 1 Sess., *House Journal*, 347.

they advised that Texas be put in a state of defense against invasion.<sup>61</sup> The whole matter ended by the two Houses failing to agree on the appropriation bill for the regular army, so even that instrument of defense was left without means of support, and was shortly after disbanded.

*(To be concluded.)*

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, 473.